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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE
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APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL.

People v. Bopp, Iil. 116 N. E. 679. Time for Preparation.
Held, that it was an abuse of discretion of the court for a murder case to
appoint counsel for the defense without giving him an opportunity for investigations or even to prepare his case. "It is not to be assumed that the appointment of counsel by the court for a person charged with crime, who is unable to
procure counsel for himself, is an empty formality, and that the counsel thus
appointed should be compelled -to act, without being allowed a reasonable time
in which to understand the case and prepare the defense. It i's the duty of
the court not only to appoint counsel of sufficient ability and experience to
present the prisoner's defense and protect him from undue oppression, but the
court should also appoint counsel who have no interest adverse to the prisoner
which would interfere with a fair presentation of his defense, and time and
opportunity should also be given to prepare for such defense."
CONFIDENCE GAME.

People v. Miller, Ill. 116 N. E. 131. Breach of promise to marry.
Where a woman, with no intention of marrying a man, promised to marry
him solely for the purpose of obtaining his money and property, which she did
obtain by such pretenses, she was not guilty merely of a breach of the marriage contract, but was guilty of an offense under the confidence.game statute
(Hurd's Rev. St. 1915-16. C. 38, 98, 99).
EMBEZZLEMENT.

People v. Dettmering, Ill. 116 N. E. 205. Ownership of property.
The ownership of property must be alleged with the same accuracy in
embezzlement as in larceny.
In this case it was alleged that the money taken by the defendant belonged
to a partnership, and certain individuals were named as among the partners,
who, as shown by the proof, were not in the firm- at the time of the alleged
defalcation. Moreover, no evidence was introduced to negative the presumption of joint ownership, which arises from the allegation that the property
belonged to a partnership, of which the evidence shows the defendant was a
member. Fraudulent conversion must be of property belonging exclusively
to a person other than the one charged.
EVIDENCE.

People v. McDonald et al. N. Y. Sup. Ct., Appel. Div. Papers illegally
seized.
Held, that under the law of New York, documentary evidence which is
relevant to the issue must be admitted in a criminal trial without inquiry as to
whether it was seized in violation of the provisions of the Civil Rights Law,

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

587

which affirms the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Likewise as to
evidence obtained by an illegal tapping of telephone wires.
INSTRUcONS.

People v. Wallace, Ill. 116 N. E. 700. Reasonable doubt.
With reference to instructions concerning proof of the accused's guilt,
beyond a reasonable doubt, the court said: "We have more than once held
that the giving of numerous instructions containing all the language restrictive
of the application of the doctrine of reasonable doubt which it has been held in
various cases not erroneous to give is improper, yet in this case, again two
pages of the abstract are filled with five instructions, warning the jury against
being misled by undue sensibility into regarding as reasonable doubts which
were only chimerical or conjectural, and against going outside the evidence
to hunt up doubts created by resorting to trivial and fanciful suppositions and
remote conjectures. The object of instructing the jury is to give them a
concise statement of the principles of law which they should apply to the case,
and not an exhaustive treatise on those principles in detail. Two pages of
discusston of the doctrine of reasonable doubt are not illuminating, but the
reverse. Two lines are better."
MURDER.
People v. Ahrling, Ill. 116 N. E. 764. Sanity. Burden of proof.
Whenever the defense of insanity is interposed, it devolves upon the state
to establish the sanity of the accused. If after all the evidence is in, the jury
entertains a reasonable doubt of the sanity of the accused, he must be
acquitted.
Weight of Evidence. While the verdict based on controverted questions
of fact in a criminal prosecutions will rarely be disturbed, the Supreme Court
will reverse a conviction where' the evidence is of unsatisfactory character.
PERJURY.
People v. Brill, N. Y. Court of Gen'l Sessions, N. Y., 165 N. Y. Supp. 65.
Materiality of false testimony.
In a prosecution for perjury the test is of materiality is not "whether as a
matter of formality the testimony might have been included under the rules
of procedure, or whether it was correctly admitted under the rules of evidence,
but rather, having been received, being false, whether it was material matter,
that is, whether it had probative value rationally to influence the result upon the
merits.
Correction of false testimoify. The following dictum is of intterest. It is
said that "even assuming the evidence was material, the indictment could not
be sustained, for it appears from the record in the civil trial that this defendant's attentions was not at first directed to the particular paper, and when a
photographic copy of it was subsequently shown him he told the truth and
admitted that he had signed it The law encourages the correction of erroneous
and even intentionally false statements on the part of a witness, and perjury
will not be predicated upon such statements when the witness, before the submission of the case, fully- corrects his testimony."
FRom CHEsTRa G. VERxIRa.
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EMBEZZLEMENT.

State v. McAvoy, R. I. 101 Atl. 109. Defense of del credere factor.
That an agent charged-with embezzlement is a del credgre factor of his
principal constitutes no defense, such relation not changing the ordinary one
existing between himself and his principal within. Gen. Laws, 1909, c. 345, par.
16, providing that every officer, agent,- clerk, or servant who shall embezzle
property, which shall have come into his possession by virtue of his employment, shall be deemed guilty of larceny.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

Hall v. State, Ariz. 165 Pac. 300. Violation of law in good faith; mistake
of fact.
It is no defense to a sale in violation of prohibitory law that defendants
relied on a guaranty of the brewers that the beer was non-intoxicating, and an
investigation showing it did not contain enough alcohol to require an internal
revenue license.
INTOXICATING LIQUOR.
State v. Kane, Dela. 101 Atl. 239. Effect of repealing statute on existing
license.
James Kane was indicted for selling intoxicating liquor on April 27, 1917,
in less quantity than One quart to be drank off the premises. The sale was
made under a special license, issued to him on the 14th day of March, 1917,
authorizing such a sale. The act under which the special license had been
issued was repealed April 4th, 1917. Held, that since the repealing statute
did not make the sale of intoxicating liquor unlawful, and contained no express
provision concerning existing licenses issued under the repealed act, the license
was good and the sale lawful.
JUDGES.

Harrisonv. State, Ga. 92 S. E. 970. Disqualification of trial judge.
The trial judge was not disqualified from passing upon a motion for a
new trial, because when imposing sentence, he had used language strongly
indicating his belief in the guilt of the defendant. Any rational disinterested
person compelled to give attention to the testimony adduced at a criminal trial,
by reason of the fact that the proper conduct thereof rested upon him as
presiding judge, must necessarily form some opinion as to the guilt or innocence
of the accused. To hold that the expression from a trial judge of his opinion
that the accused is guilty, after the jury has returned a verdict so finding,
would effectually disqualify such judge from passing upon a motion for a
new trial, and would negative the possibility of his fairly exercising his discretionary power to grant a new trial on a review of the evidence, or would either
invite or insure rulings on questions of law raised in such a motion adverse to
the defendant, would bring into question the impartiality of every trial judge
who uttered a word of condemnation of the convicted criminal or the crime
when imposing sentence, and would throw an unmerited cloud of suspicion
upon his purpose to execute the law in accordance with his official oath where
anything more was said than was simply necessary to indicate the punishment
fixed by the judgment of the court. A rational, intelligent judge, acquainted
with the law of evidence, necessarily reaches some opinion during the progress
of the trial as to the guilt of the accused; but this opinion, whether or not
expressed at the time sentence is imposed, is presumably not fixed and irre-
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vocable, but subject to change upon a review of the record when the motion
for a new trial is presented for determination.
LARCENY.

Gates v. State, Ga. 92 S. E. 974. Is intoxicating liquor subject of larceny
in a prohibition state?
The tenth and eleventh grounds of the amendment to the motion for a
new trial complains that the property alleged to have been stolen was of no
value and was not property under the laws of the State of Georgia, and that
the state failed to prove that the said property had any .legal value, for the
reason that Georgia was a prohibition state. There is no merit in this objection. There was proof as to the value of the stolen intoxicants, which were
legally in the possession of a common carrier for inter-state transportation at
the time of the burglary. Also, "value," as the word is used in prosecutions
for larceny, does not necessarily mean money value or market value.
RAPE.

Gracy v. State, Okla. 166 Pac. 442. Does use of narcotic constitute force?
Under an information for rape which alleged that the defendant committed
the offense "by force and violence, overcoming-the resistance of the prosecutrix,"
as set forth in subdivision 4, Par. 2414, Rev. Laws 1910, evidence is admissable
that the offence was committed by means of an intoxicating narcotic administered to her by the defendant or with his privity.
TRIAL.

State v. Gens, S. Car. 93-S. E. 139. Misconduct of bystanders.
Where, in a prosecution for bringing intoxicating liquor into the state,
certain women sat directly in front of the jury holding large posters condemning the liquor traffic, which the jury saw and read, a new trial should have
been granted, since their act was an attempt to impede justice, to deny the
defendant a fair and impartial trial, and to influence the jury to arrive at a
verdict improperly.
TRIAL.

Allen v. State, Okla. 165 Pac. 745. Delegating reception of verdict.
Where during the trial of a homicide case, the jury having retired to
deliberate on their verdict, the judge was incapacitated from further proceeding with the trial on account of sickness, and by agreement of the parties,
he designated an attorney of the court to receive the verdict of the jury.
Held, that the reception of the verdict in a criminal case is a judicial act,
which cannot be delegated, and a verdict so received is a nullity, and that no
judgment of conviction could be lawfully pronounced upon such a verdict.
Held, further, that the discharge of the jury under such circumstances
must be deemed to have been with the consent of the defendant.
TRIAL.
Commonwealth v. Stauslr, Pa. 101 At. 72. Passing sentence on plea of
guilty without hearing evidence.
Act of March 31, 1860 (P. L. 402) Sec. 74, providing that, where a defendant pleads guilty to an indictment for murder, the court shall proceed by
examination of witnesses t6 determine the degree of the crime, must be strictly
construed, and thereunder the examination of witnesses by the court means
the seeing and hearing of ihe witnesses, and the mere reading of their testi-
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mony by a judge or judges who did not see or hear them is not a compliance
with the act. ,
Under such provision held that every member of a court passing upon
the degree of guilt must see and hear the witnesses upon whose testimony the
degree of homicide is to be determined, and where three of the five judges
heard the testimony and thereafter the president judge, who was not present
during the examination of witnesses, read the evidence, and joined in the
deliberations, and wrote the court's opinion, fixing the crime as murder 'in
the first degree, the judgment should be reversed, and a procedendo awarded
with leave to defetfdant to renew in the court below a motion to withdraw his
plea of guilty.

By MR. JUSTICE

1

O'NEIL.

State of Louisiana
v.
No. 22,296.
Ernest Carmouche and George Chust. I
Appeal from the Twenty-first Judicial District Court, Parish of Point
Coupee-C. K. Schwing, Judge.
The defendants have appealed from a verdict convicting them of cattle
stealing and from a sentence of imprisonment in the peniteniary.
Two bills of exception were taken to the rulings of the trial judge 9rdering a juror discharged and another impaneled in his stead, after twelve jurors
had been impaneled and sworn and the bill of indictment or information had
been read to them.
The facts set forth in the two bills of exception were as follows: When
the impaneling of the jury was completed, each of the defendants had used
all of his twelve peremptory challenges and the state had used ten of its
twelve peremptory challenges. The oath was administered to each of the
twelve jurors impaneled to try the case, and the district attorney read to them
the bill of information. It being then late in the evening, the court adjourned
until the next morning. During the night, a juror named Beatty, who had
been impaneled, and to whom the oath had been administered and the bill
of information read, met with an accident, and was, in the opinion of the
trial judge, physically unable to serve on the jury. When court convened on
the following morning the judge announced that, on account of the physical
disability of the juror, Beatty, it would be necessary to discharge him from
the jury and select another juror from the talesmen who had been drawn
and called the day before. The defendant's attorneys requested that the
trial of the case be postponed, to allow the disabled juror time to recover
and serve on the jury. In the alternative, the defendant's attorneys requested
that, if the court should insist upon removing Mr. Beatty from the jury and
the immediate drawing of another juror in his stead, then that each of the
defendants should be"allowed one or more peremptory challenge, because the
state had yet two peremptory challenges, and, in using and exhausting their
twenty-four peremptory challenges, the defendants had anticipated and believed
that only twelve jurors would be impaneled, whereas the discharge of Mi-.
Beatty and the drawing of another juror in his stead would amount to the
impaneling of thirteen jurors. The court ordered that the trial should be
proceeded with immediately, by the discharge of the disabled juror, Beatty,
and the drawing of another juror in his stead, aficruled that the defendants
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would not be allowed another peremptory challenge in the drawing of a juror
to take the place of Mr. Beatty. It appears that Beatty was the sixth juror
impaneled, and that, when the state and the defendants accepted him as a
juror, the state had used two peremptory challenges, the defendant, Chust, had
used seven, and the defendant, Carmouche, had used five. To the rulings
stated above, the defendant's attorneys reserved a bill of exceptions and announced that they would take part in the selection of another juror only
under protest.
The remaining tales jurors who had been drawn and called on the day
previous, were then called on their voire dire, and, the list of talesmen being
exhausted, the court ordered other talesmen drawn and called. The district
attorney was permitted to exercise his right to challenge peremptorily two of
the tales jurors who were called on their voire dire. The district attorney
finally accepted a juror to take the place of Beatty, and the attorneys for the
defendants challenged him peremptorily. The district attorney objected to
the peremptory challenge, on the ground that the defendants had exhausted
their peremtory challenges in the original drawing'of the jury. The court
sustained the objection and the juror was impaneled and sworn, and served
on the jury. To that ruling, the defendant's attorneys reserved another bill
of exceptions.
There is no merit in the bill of exceptions taken to the ruling of the
court, refusing to postpone the trial long enough for the disabled juror to
recover. He was suffering from a broken arm, and the judge exercised his
discretion wisely in removing him from the jury instead of postponing the
trial long enough for him to recover from such an injury.
It is well settled that the trial judge may, after the jury has been impaneled
and sworn, discharge a juror who has become physically incapable of serving
on the jury. See State v. Costello, 11 La. Ann. 283; State v. Diskin, 34 La.
Ann. 919; State, v. Lawson, 36 La. Ann. 275; State v. Moncla, 39 La. Ann.
868, 2 South, 814; State v. Nash & Barnett, 46 La. Ann. 194, 14 South. 607;
State v. Duvall, 135 La. 710, 65 South. 904.
If an incompetent juror who has been impaneled and sworn be discharged
from the panel before the trial is commenced by the reading of the indictment
to the jury, the defendant is not entitled to have his peremptory challenges
restored to him, or to have the remaining 11 jurors re-tendered on their
voire dire for acceptance or rejection, even though the defendant had exhausted
his peremptory challenges when the disqualified juror was discharged. But,
if a juror be removed from the panel for any cause, against the protest of the
defendant, after the trial hats commenced by the reading of the indictment to
the jury, the discharging of the disqualified juror and the drawing of another
juror in his stead is, in effect, the entering of a mistrial and the beginning of a
new trial; and the defendant is then entitled to have his peremptory challenges
restored to him and to have the remaining 11 jurors re-tendered on their
voire dire for acceptance or rejection, especially if the defendant's peremptory
challenges were exhausted in the original drawing of the jury. See State v.
Moncla, 39 La. Ann. 868, 2 South. 814; State v. Nash & Barnett, 46 La. Ann.
194, 14 South. 607; State v. Duvall et al., 135 La. 710, 65 South. 904; 14 Cent.
Dig. Crim. L. So. 302; Bishop's Cr. Proc. No. 809. In the case last cited,
State v. Duvall et al., where the disqualified juror was discharged after the
indictment had been read to the jury, the defendants did not insist upon having
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their peremptory challenges restored to them or the remaining 11 jurors retendered on their voir dire for acceptance or rejection. They asked merely
"that the remaining 11 jurors be sworn de novo to try the case." It was held,
on rehearing, that that request implied an acceptance of the 11 jurors by the
defendants, and that the re-swearing of the jurors to try the case would have
been an idle and useless ceremony.
In this case also, the request of the defendants, -that only one peremptory
challenge be restored to each of them, was an implied acceptance of the
remaining 11 jurors who had been sworn to try the case. The defendants
were entitled to have a mistrial entered and a new trial commenced by having
the remaining 11 jurors discharged from the panel, having the twelve peremptory challenges restored to each of the defendants, and the impaneling of
the jury commenced anew. But they did not demand that. On the contrary,
they waived that privilege by accepting the remaining 11 jurors who had been
impaneled and sworn. They were not then entitled to another peremptory
challenge. The defendant is not, under any circumstances, entitled to more
than twelve peremtory challenges. State v. Nash & Barnett, 46 La. Ann. 193,
14 South. 607; Jackson v. State, 78 Ala. 471; State of North Dakota v. Hasledahl, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 152. 1t must be borne in mind that the defendants
had each exhausted their twelve peremptory challenges in the selection of the
twelve jurors, of whom they were willing that 11 should be retained; and
they were not any more'entitled to another peremptory challenge than if the
juror who became incapacitated to serve after he was impaneled had been excused from the jury before he was sworn to try the case. The refusal to allow
either of the accused more than twelve challenges in the impaneling of the
jury was a correct ruling.
Two other bills of exception were taken to the rulings of the judge in
admitting certain testimony that was objected to as hearsay evidence. The
evidence was admitted against one of the defendants, becausq the trial judge
concluded that the declaration made by the third party, not under oath, was
made in the presence and hearing of that defendant without contradiction or
protest on his part. The testimony on the question, whether the defendant
heard or was near enough to hear, the statement that was introduced in
evidence against him, was not reduced to writing, in accordance with the Act
No. 113 of 1896; and the facts recited in the bill of exceptions do not warrant
our reversing the ruling.
The verdict and sentence appealed from are affirmed.
Syllabus.
(1) If a juror becomes physically disabled 'after the jury has been impaneled and sworn in a criminal case, the trial judge has authority to discharge
the disqualified or disabled juror and immediately order another juror drawn
in his stead.
(2) If the discharge or removal of a disqualified juror who was impaneled
and sworn for the trial of a criminal case be made before the indictment is
read to the jury, the defendant is not entitled to have his peremptory challenges restored to him or to have the remaining 11 jurors re-tendered for
acceptance or rejection, even though the defendant had exhausted his peremptory challenges when the disqualified juror was discharged.
(3) If a juror be removed from the panel for any cause, against the
protest of the defendant, after the trial has commenced by the reading of the
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indictment to the jury, the discharge of the disqualified juror and the drawing
of another juror in his stead, is, in effect, the entering of a mistrial and the
beginning of a new trial; and the defendant-is then entitled to have his peremptory challenges restored to him, and to have the remaining 11 jurors
re-tendered for acceptance or rejection, especially if the defendant's peremptory challenges were exhausted in the original drawing of the jury . But, if the
defendant, instead of requiring that the 12 peremptory challenges be restored
to him and that the remaining 11 jurors be re-tendered for acceptance or
rejection, accepts them, he is not entitled to another or thirteenth challenge.
(4) If the defendant, appealing from a conviction in a criminal prosecution, fails to avail himself of the privilege accorded him by the Act No. 113 of
1896, of having the evidence on a question of fact on which an adverse ruling
of the trial judge was based, reduced to writing and embodied in the transcript of appeal, the Supreme Ccurt will accept the statement made or approved
by the trial judge in the bill of exceptions.
W. 0. HART, New Orleans.

